 sections 67, 68, 73, 81, 82, 98, 100, 108, 109, 110, 113, 115, 116 
Argument

I International Standards
Over the last several decades, international standards for the administration of military justice have come increasingly in focus. These standards emerge from several sources. 14. Decaux Principle 14 concerns the "public nature of hearings." Courts-martial should be public except for the very rare case in which good cause exists for conducting parts of a hearing in camera. The reasons for any closure of the hearing should be fully stated on the record and any such closure should be kept to the bare minimum. Current Nepalese law does not guarantee either public trials in courts-martial or public hearings in court-martial appeals.
15. Decaux Principle 15 lists a number of procedural rights that are essential to a just and fair court-martial:
(a) Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law; (b) Every accused person must be informed promptly of the details of the offence with which he or she is charged and, before and during the trial, must be guaranteed all the rights and facilities necessary for his or her defence;
(c) No one shall be punished for an offence except on the basis of individual criminal responsibility;
(d) Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be tried without undue delay and in his or her presence;
(e) Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to defend himself or herself in person or through legal assistance of his or her own choosing; to be informed, if he or she does not have legal assistance, of this right; and to have legal assistance assigned to him or her, in any case where the interests of justice so require, and without payment by him or her in any such case if he or she does not have sufficient means to pay for it;
(f) No one may be compelled to testify against himself or herself or to confess guilt;
(g) Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him or her and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his or her behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him or her; 53. The provision of legal assistance by military lawyers, particularly when they are officially appointed, has been challenged as inconsistent with respect for the rights of the defence. Simply in the light of the adage that "justice should not only be done but should be seen to be done", the presence of military lawyers damages the credibility of these jurisdictions. Yet experience shows that the trend towards the strict independence of military lawyers -if it proves to be genuine despite the fundamental ambiguity in the title -helps to guarantee to accused persons an effective defence that is adapted to the functional constraints involved in military justice, particularly when it is applied extraterritorially. Nevertheless, the principle of free choice of defence counsel should be maintained, and accused persons should be able to call on lawyers of their own choosing if they do not wish to avail themselves of the assistance of a military lawyer. For this reason, rather than advocating the simple abolition of the post of military lawyer, it seemed preferable to note the current trend, subject to two conditions: that the principle of free choice of defence counsel by the accused is safeguarded, and that the strict independence of the military lawyer is guaranteed.
A soldier who is to be tried by court-martial must have the right to reject the services of a military attorney in whom he does not have confidence, and either defend himself or make other arrangements for his defence. Courts-martial serve purposes other than simply the punishment of crime; they also are intended to ensure good order and discipline within an armed force and thereby contribute to the successful accomplishment of the military's mission, whether that be success in the use of force in a military operation or simply as a deterrent. Many countries' legal systems have grappled with whether courts-martial are even properly thought of as courts. In the United States, for example, the Supreme Court long ago held that courts-martial do not exercise the "judicial power of the United States" within the meaning of Article III of the U.S. Constitution.
11 That court later held that the lowest level of court-martial-the one-officer summary court-martial-does not qualify as a criminal prosecution and therefore need not comply with the important constitutional protection of the right to counsel.
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In the last century, courts-martial came increasingly to resemble regular courts of law.
Provision was widely made for legal issues to be ruled on by judges trained in the law, and for legally-trained military prosecutors and defense counsel. The rules of evidence also came increasingly to resemble those applied in civilian criminal courts, and in a number of countries civilian appellate courts were created to hear appeals from courts-martial, with eventual review by the highest civilian court.
At times, these efforts to judicialize military justice ran into problems, as recently oc- Despite the additional purposes courts-martial serve beyond simply the punishment and deterrence of crime and the fact that the pace, process and success of the judicialization of military justice have been uneven around the world, there is little question today that courts-martial are courts in every sense. Article 101(2) of the Interim Constitution specifically authorizes the creation of "special types of courts," a phrase that is certainly broad enough to include courts-martial. The Army Act itself, in section 98, explicitly treats courtsmartial as courts. The proviso to Article 101 provides that "no court . . . shall be constituted for the purpose of hearing a particular case." Because this language precludes ad hoc courtsmartial, they must be standing bodies.
III International Trends in Military Justice Systems
Several international trends may be seen in contemporary military justice. One, particularly apparent in Northern Europe, is the abandonment of military justice in favor of reliance on either administrative sanctions or the regular civilian courts to secure good order and discipline and punish criminal conduct by military personnel.
14 Another trend is to whittle down the jurisdiction of courts-martial either as to who is subject to it or as to what offenses may be tried by courts-martial (and correspondingly, which types of offenses must be tried in the civilian courts).
A third trend is manifest in English-speaking countries other than the United States.
In these countries, the military justice system has been dramatically altered by shrinking the Although there is some truth to the notion that the military is separate and distinct from civilian society, 17 that separation has receded in recent decades, even where conscription has been abandoned in favor of career, professional military workforces. Young people who enter the military today expect that they will be treated fairly and that the rights to which they are accustomed in civilian life will largely, if not completely, be honored while they are in uniform.
Increasing attention has been paid to the rights of military personnel both by schol- conferring jurisdiction on the Court of Appeal to hear all such appeals. In either event, the decision on appeal should be subject to review by the Supreme Court.
The Appellate Committee should be abolished. Appellate hearings should be open to the public on the same terms as courts-martial.
9. Chain-of-command and Government review of courts-martial for purposes other than clemency violate the right to an independent and impartial judicial decision.
Post-trial review of courts-martial by military authorities and Government should be confined to the exercise of clemency.
10. Protection against unlawful command influence and retaliation are key ingredients of judicial independence, but are not currently provided by law. This protection should include criminal sanctions for violations.
11. The current requirement of Court-Martial Regulation rule 5(4) that a statement be obtained from the suspect violates the constitutional protection against selfincrimination. The Supreme Court should make clear that all suspects who are in-terrogated are informed that they have no duty to make a statement, that any statement they make may be held against them, and that they have a right to remain silent and to consult with counsel before deciding whether to make a statement.
12. Section 72 of the current statute permits the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction over persons who once were, but no longer are, soldiers. The exercise of courtmartial jurisdiction over such persons, who are civilians, is contrary to the Decaux Principles, although it must be acknowledged as a matter of candor to this Court that some countries permit such carryover jurisdiction.
13. The current provision of Section 87 of the Army Act for sealed questionnaires to witnesses violates the constitutional right to a fair trial because evidence might in some circumstances be adduced at trial without affording the accused an opportunity to examine the witness. Sealed questionnaires should be permitted only if the accused or his or her attorney is present during the completion of the questionnaire.
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Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the ICJ and NIMJ respectfully ask that this brief as amici curiae be accepted, and counsel for the ICJ and NIMJ respectfully ask that they be permitted In reviewing the Army Act we identified certain other provisions that should be reevaluated in light of evolving international standards. For example, ch. 4 of the Court-Martial Regulation permits such human rights offenses as torture and "disappearance" to be tried in the Special Court-Martial. Contemporary standards, however, call for such offenses to be tried in civilian courts. We also wonder whether the Court of Enquiry process prescribed in ch. 2 of the Court-Martial Regulation is more cumbersome than it needs to be. That issue goes beyond the questions presented in this litigation, but would certainly be a matter the responsible officials could usefully review.
